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Abstract
We use a Schumpeterian model in which both the economy￿s growth rate and its volatility are en-
dogenously determined to assess some welfare and policy implications associated with business cycle
￿uctuations. Because it features a higher average growth rate than its acyclical counterpart, steady￿
state welfare is higher along the cyclical equilibrium growth path of the model. We assess the impact
of alternative stabilization policies designed to smooth cyclical ￿uctuations. Although, it is possible
to signi￿cantly reduce the variance of output growth via simple policy measures, the welfare bene￿ts
are at best negligible and at worst completely oﬀset by the resulting reduction long￿term productivity
growth.
∗This is a modi￿ed and extended version of the paper entitled ￿Schumpeterian Restructuring￿ presented at the CREI-
W o r l dB a n kC o n f e r e n c eo nt h eG r o w t ha n dW e l f a r eE ﬀects of Macroeconomic Volatility in Barcelona February 2006. We
thank Thierry Tressel for a helpful discussion.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A common presumption amongst economists and policy￿makers is that business cycle ￿uctuations impose
signi￿cant welfare costs. One potential source of such costs is the volatility of consumption faced by risk￿
averse households. However, as Lucas (1987) famously demonstrated, in the context of a representative
household model with CES preferences, the volatility of US aggregate consumption is too low to impose
much of a welfare cost. An alternative potential source of welfare costs is emphasized by Barlevy (2004a) in
an AK model with adjustment costs ￿ variability in investment levels leads to less productive investment
on average and, hence, to an endogenously lower long￿run growth rate. In this article, we consider the
welfare implications of ￿uctuations and growth in the context of an economy in which cyclical ￿uctuation,
as well as growth, are endogenously determined. We abstract from the impacts of uncertainty, and focus
instead on the role played by trade￿oﬀs between innovative activity and ￿xed capital formation over the
business cycle. In contrast to the standard presumption, we show that cycles can raise welfare by inducing
greater innovation on average and that stabilization policies which reduce volatility can often be welfare
reducing because of their detrimental impact on long￿term productivity growth.
Lucas (1987) compared utility along a smoothly growing consumption path with that along a cyclical
one. Both cyclical variation and trend growth were exogenously given and there was no underlying model
of the macroeconomy. In this simple framework he asked what percentage of yearly consumption a repre-
sentative household would be willing to forego to be free of the variations in consumption. The answer he
found was not much (0.1 of a percent). In contrast he found that a household would be willing to give up a
large proportion (20%) of yearly consumption to increase the growth rate by a mere one per cent, leading
him to conclude that, the welfare consequences of business cycle ￿uctuations pale in comparison to those
of growth. Subsequent papers have explored extensions of Lucas￿ parsimonious set-up. Imrohoglu (1999)
and Atkeson and Phelan (1995) relax the assumption of complete markets, but still report small gains to
eradicating ￿uctuations. A number of others ￿ Obstfeld (1994), Pemberton (1996) and Dolmas (1998) ￿
explore the implications of a non-expected utility representation but also ￿nd relatively small gains. Larger
g a i n sa r i s ew h e nh a b i tf o r m a t i o ni si n c l u d e di np r e f e r e n c e s( s e eV a nW i n c o o p( 1994), Campbell (1998)
and Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), and if various kinds of agent heterogeneity are allowed (see Beaudry
and Pages, 1996, Gomes Greenwood and Rebello, 1998, and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron 2000).1
Barlevy (2004a) considers a model in which ￿uctuations are driven by exogenous productivity shocks,
but long￿run growth is endogenously determined and is aﬀected by the variance of these shocks. The
connection between ￿uctuations and growth that he explores arises if the growth rate is concave in the rate
of investment. Because investment alternates between high levels during expansions when marginal costs
are high, and low levels during contractions when marginal costs are low, there is an eﬃciency and growth
1For a comprehensive survey of this literature see Barlevy (2004b).
1cost associated with productivity shocks. He estimates a potentially large welfare improvement resulting
from the eﬀect on investment and hence growth of removing the shocks. A key insight of Barlevy￿s work
i st h a tap o s s i b l ea v e n u eb yw h i c hw e l f a r em a yb ea d v e r s e l ya ﬀected is when cycles aﬀect the economy￿s
growth rate.
In this article, we study an economy in which, not just the growth rate, but the economy￿s cyclical
behaviour itself is an equilibrium outcome. In Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) we develop a basic Schum-
peterian paradigm in which business cycle ￿uctuations are an intrinsic part of the growth process ￿
expansions re￿ect the endogenous, clustered implementation of productivity improvements, and recessions
are the negative side￿product of the restructuring that anticipates them. In Francois and Lloyd￿Ellis (2006)
we extend the model to allow for (potentially reversible) capital accumulation and show how ￿uctuations
in the investment rate support the incentives needed to generate the multi￿sector cycle. This extension is
particularly important for an analysis of the welfare implications of cycles because it implies that consump-
tion is partially smoothed relative to output. The welfare implications of cycles in an economy without
such smoothing overstates the volatility of consumption and hence the costs of business cycles.
Our analytical framework has two key implications which we emphasize:
￿ Eradicating cycles is not just a question of shutting down some exogenous productivity process, but
involves switching to a distinct equilibrium growth path. The economy has both an acyclical and a cyclical
equilibrium growth path. Although the cyclical growth path exhibits greater consumption volatility than
the corresponding acyclical one, it also generates higher growth. We ￿nd that the growth eﬀect on welfare
dominates the volatility eﬀect ￿ in our calibrated simulation exercise, for example, welfare is over 30%
lower along the acyclical path. To understand why, note that along the acyclical growth path, productivity
improvements are implemented immediately. Consequently the opportunity cost (due to lost production)
of searching for new ideas rises in proportion to the growth in their value, with no reallocation of labor
eﬀort across sectors. Along the cyclical growth path implementation is delayed during downturns, so that
the opportunity cost would can only rise in proportion to their value if search intensity accelerates. During
expansions the opportunity cost of search rises so much relative to the bene￿ts that to equate them would
require more labor eﬀort to be allocated into production than is available. Since search eﬀort is bounded
below by zero, it follows that the average level of entrepreneurship, and hence growth, is higher in the
cyclical equilibrium.
￿ In contrast to other studies, it is possible to consider the impact of policy measures designed to ￿stabilize￿
the economy by reducing the variance of output growth. We consider 3 simple policy measures: taxes on
pro￿ts, state￿dependent taxes or subsidies to capital accumulation, and Keynesian￿style counter-cyclical
tax/transfer policies. We show that all three of these policy measures can be designed to substantially
reduce the volatility of output growth, thereby stabilizing the economy. However, in steady￿state, any
2welfare gains resulting from this stabilization are minute because the impacts on consumption volatility
are so small. Moreover, while capital taxes and counter￿cyclical tax/transfers can be designed in a way
that is neutral with respect to long run growth, increased pro￿tt a x e ss t i ￿e growth by mitigating the
incentives to innovate and thereby reduce welfare. Of the set of policies that we analyze, none are able to
simultaneously raise growth and reduce ￿uctuations.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model and develop an explicit role for
policy interventions. In Section 3 we brie￿y consider the acyclical equilibrium growth path and Section 4
we develop the cyclical equilibrium growth path. Section 5 considers the welfare implications of switching
between the two equilibria and Section 6 discusses the consequences of various stabilization policies. Section
7 concludes and mathematical details are relegated to an appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Assumptions
There is no aggregate uncertainty. Time is continuous and indexed by t ≥ 0. The economy is closed. The
representative household has iso￿elastic preferences
U(t)=
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)C(τ)1−σ − 1
1 − σ
dτ, (1)
where ρ denotes the rate of time preference and σ represents the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. The household maximizes (1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
Z ∞
t
e−[R(τ)−R(t)]C(τ)dτ ≤ S(t)+
Z ∞
t
e−[R(τ)−R(t)] [w(τ)+Υ(τ)]dτ (2)
where w(t) denotes wage income, S(t) denotes the household￿s stock of assets (￿rm shares and capital)
at time t and R(t) denotes the discount factor from time zero to t. The term Υ(τ) represents lump￿sum
transfers from the government (see below). The population is normalized to unity and each household is
endowed with one unit of labor hours, which it supplies inelastically.
Final output is produced according to a Cobb￿Douglas production function utilizing physical capital,
K(t), and a continuum of intermediates, xi, indexed by i ∈ [0,1] :
Y (t)=K(t)αX(t)1−α, (3)
where α ∈ (0,1) and
X(t)=e x p
µZ 1
0
lnxi(t)di
¶
. (4)
Final output can be used for private consumption, C(t), investment, œ K(t), or (potentially) stored. More-
over, household may receive transfers net of all tax revenue from the government amounting to Ψ(t).I t
follows that
C(t)+ œ K(t)+δK(t) ≤ Y (t)+Ψ(t), (5)
3where δ denotes the rate of physical depreciation. Although we allow physical capital to be reversible in
principle, in the equilibria we study negative investment never actually occurs.
Output of intermediate i depends upon the state of technology in sector i, Ai (t), and labor hours,
Li(t), according to a simple linear technology:
xi(t)=Ai(t)Li(t) (6)
Intermediates are completely used up in production, but can be produced and stored for later use. Incum-
bent intermediate producers must therefore decide whether to sell now, or store and sell later.
Commercially viable productivity improvements are introduced into the economy via a process of
￿entrepreneurial search￿. Competitive entrepreneurs in each sector allocate labor eﬀort to searching for
ideas, and ￿nance this by selling claims. The rate of success from search is ￿hi(t), where ￿ is a parameter,
and hi represents the labor eﬀort allocated to search in sector i. At each date, entrepreneurs decide whether
or not to allocate labor to search, and if they do so, how much. The aggregate labor eﬀort allocated to
search is given by
H(t)=
Z 1
0
hi(t)dt. (7)
New ideas and innovations dominate old ones in terms of productivity by a factor eγ, where γ > 0. This
process is therefore formally identical to the innovation process in the quality￿ladder model of Grossman
and Helpman (1991). However, we explicitly do not interpret this activity as R&D. Although it is common
to do so in the endogenous growth literature, this Poisson process is, in fact, a very bad description of R&D.
Typically R&D is a knowledge-intensive (and often capital-intensive) activity, which involves accumulation
of sector-speci￿c knowledge. In sharp contrast, the search activity described here is a skill-intensive one,
which we interpret as a form of entrepreneurship. In our view this entrepreneurial function is the central
player in economic activity, with R&D playing a supportive role that is not modeled here.2 This activity
could be undertaken by independent entrepreneurs, but in modern production it is often a role taken on
by managers and other skilled workers within ￿rms.3
Successful manager/entrepreneurs must choose whether or not to implement commercially viable ideas
immediately or delay until a later date. Once they implement, the associated knowledge becomes publicly
available, and can be built upon by rivals. However, prior to implementation, the knowledge is privately
held by the entrepreneur. We let the indicator function Zi(t) take on the value 1 if there exists a commer-
cially viable innovation in sector i which has not yet been implemented, and 0 otherwise. The set of dates
in which new ideas are implemented in sector i is denoted by Ωi.W el e tV I
i (t) denote the expected present
2In Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2006b) we introduce endogenous R&D as a separate, knowledge-intensive activity that
generates ideas whose commercial viability is unclear. As in the current paper, entrepreneurial search is counter-cyclical, but
R&D investment is pro-cyclical.
3For example, Nickell, Nicolitsas and Patterson (2001) ￿nd that ￿managerial innovations￿ are concentrated during in
downturns.
4value of pro￿ts from implementing a success at time t,a n dV D
i (t) denote that of delaying implementation
from time t until the most pro￿table future date.
2.2 The Public Sector
We consider a limited number of simple policy instruments. Pro￿ts earned from intermediate production
may be taxed/subsidized at a constant rate, ω ∈ (−1,1). 4 The return to capital can be taxed/subsidized
at a rate τ(t) ∈ (−1,1), which could be time￿varying. In particular, we will allow this tax rate to vary
between the expansions and contractions. We assume throughout that depreciation is tax￿deductible. Total
revenue from these proportional taxes is denoted by Φ(t)
As noted above, the government can also levy lump￿sum taxes and pay out lump￿sum transfers, where
the net transfer at time t is denoted Υ(t). The net outlay of the public sector at time t are therefore given
by Ψ(t)=Υ(t) − Φ(t). In the equilibrium analysis below, we assume throughout that the public sector
satis￿es its intertemporal budget constraint
Z ∞
t
e−[R(s)−R(t)]Ψ(s)ds =
Z ∞
t
e−[R(s)−R(t)] [Υ(s) − Φ(s)]ds =0 , (8)
where without loss of generality we assume that the government￿s initial asset position is zero.
Before proceeding to analysis of the welfare, variance and growth eﬀects of government interventions,
we ￿rst de￿ne an equilibrium in this model and then characterize the stationary ￿ acyclical ￿ equilibrium
which is analogous to the standard equilibrium of Schumpeterian quality ladders models. We then proceed
to solve for the more complicated cyclical equilibrium, which involves a stationary cycle.
2.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Given initial state variables {Ai(0),Z i(0)}1
i=0,K(0) an equilibrium for this economy consists of:
(1) sequences
n
￿ pi(t), ￿ xi(t). ￿ Li(t), ￿ hi(t), ￿ Ai(t), ￿ Zi(t), ￿ V I
i (t), ￿ V D
i (t)
o
t∈[0,∞)
for each intermediate sector
i, and
(2) economy wide sequences
n
￿ Y (t), ￿ K(t), ￿ R(t), ￿ w(t), ￿ q(t), ￿ C (t), ￿ S (t)
o
t∈[0,∞)
which satisfy the following conditions:
￿ Households allocate consumption over time to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint, (2). The
￿rst￿order conditions of the household￿s optimization imply that
￿ C(t)σ = ￿ C(τ)σe
b R(t)−b R(τ)−ρ(t−τ) ∀ t,τ, (9)
4The pro￿t tax can be thought of as a convenient representation of various other realistic factors, including implementation
costs, imitation and labor market imperfections, which are not directly modeled in our set up, but which imply that some of
the rent accruing to ￿rms is not appropriated by their owners. Since the full amount of this revenue is not appropriated by
the government, it is not able to set this tax to zero. However, it can in￿uence the level.
5and that the transversality condition holds
lim
τ→∞e− ￿ R(τ) ￿ S(τ)=0 (10)
￿ Final goods producers choose capital and intermediates, xi, to minimize costs given prices pi, subject to
(3). The derived demand for intermediate i is
xd
i(t)=( 1− α)
Y (t)
pi(t)
. (11)
The conditional demand for capital is given by
K(t)=
αY (t)
q(t)
(12)
￿ The unit elasticity of demand for intermediates implies that limit pricing at the unit cost of the previous
incumbent is optimal. It follows that
pi(t)=
w(t)
e−γAi(t)
∀t (13)
The resulting instantaneous pro￿t (before any taxes) earned in each sector is given by
π(t)=( 1− e−γ)(1 − α)Y (t). (14)
￿ Labor markets clear: Z 1
0
￿ Li(t)di + ￿ H(t)=1 (15)
￿ Arbitrage trading in ￿nancial markets implies that, for all assets that are held in strictly positive amounts
by households, the rate of return between time t and time s must equal
￿ R(s)− ￿ R(t)
s−t .
￿ Free entry into entrepreneurship:
￿max[￿ V D
i (t), ￿ V I
i (t)] ≤ ￿ w(t), ￿ hi(t) ≥ 0 with at least one equality. (16)
￿ At dates where there is implementation, entrepreneurs with commercially viable ideas must prefer to
implement rather than delay until a later date
￿ V I
i (t) ≥ ￿ V D
i (t) ∀ t ∈ ￿ Ωi. (17)
￿ At dates where there is no implementation, either there must be no useful ideas available to implement,
or entrepreneurs with successful ideas must prefer to delay rather than implement:
Either ￿ Zi(t)=0 ,( 18)
or if ￿ Zi(t)=1 , ￿ V I
i (t) ≤ ￿ V D
i (t) ∀ t/ ∈ ￿ Ωi.
￿ Free entry of replacement capital.
￿ The government￿s intertemporal budget constraint holds.
63 The Acyclical Equilibrium Growth Path
In the economy we have described, there exists an acyclical steady state equilibrium growth path which
closely corresponds to that already well analyzed in Schumpeterian quality ladders models. Along such a
path, entrepreneurial successes are implemented immediately, and due to the large number of sectors, the
economy grows smoothly at rate ga, with a symmetric allocation of entrepreneurial eﬀort to all sectors.
There are no ￿uctuations in any of the economy￿s aggregates. Provided that the parameters of the model
are such that r(t) >g a(t) along the equilibrium path, so that household utility is bounded, then the growth
rate is given by
ga =
γ [￿(1 − e−γ)(1 − ω) − ρe−γ]
(σ − 1)γ +1
(19)
This equilibrium describes an economy that is, in most respects, identical to that which has been
analyzed in Grossman and Helpman (1991), with the exception of the complications arising from capital
accumulation.5 Note that the long-run growth rate in this equilibrium is independent of capital taxes,
τ(t), and net transfers, Υ(t), and depends only on the tax/subsidy on pro￿ts, ω. In this model, capital
accumulation plays only a supporting role in driving long￿run growth and, while an increase in τ will eﬀect
the level of K(t) along the balanced growth path, it does not impact the long￿run growth rate. Changes
in public net transfers have no distortionary aﬀects and, again, only aﬀect levels not growth rates. In
contrast, increasing ω directly reduces the marginal returns to innovation causing growth to fall. These
same qualitative implications for long￿run growth also carry over to the cyclical equilibrium discussed
below. However, as we will see, all three of these policy parameters have short￿run growth aﬀects and
hence have implications for volatility and welfare.
4 The Cyclical Equilibrium Growth Path
Suppose that implementation occurs at discrete dates denoted by Tν where v ∈ {1,2,...,∞}. We adopt
the convention that the vth cycle starts at time Tv−1 and ends at time Tν. After implementation at date
Tv−1 an expansion is triggered by a productivity boom and continues through subsequent ￿xed capital
formation. During this phase entrepreneurial search ceases and consequently all labor eﬀort is used in
production. At some time T∗
v, search commences and labor starts to be withdrawn from production.
Commercially viable ideas are not implemented immediately but are withheld until time Tv.D u r i n g
this contraction phase, ￿xed capital formation continues, but the rate of investment declines rapidly.
As aggregate demand falls, labor continues to be released from production, so that search accelerates in
anticipation of the subsequent implementation boom.
5Aghion and Howitt (2003, ch. 3) develop a related Schumpeterian growth model which allows for capital accumulation.
In these models, capital accumulation has little impact on the qualitative nature of the growth path.
7Let Pi(s) denote the probability that, since time Tv−1, no commercially viable ideas have materialized
in sector i by time s. It follows that the probability of there being no success by time Tv conditional on
there having been none by time t,i sg i v e nb yPi(Tv)/Pi(t). Hence, the value of an incumbent ￿rm in a
sector where new ideas have arisen by time t during the vth cycle can be expressed as
V I
0,i(t)=( 1− ω)
Z Tv
t
e−[R(τ)−R(t)]πi(τ)dτ +
Pi(Tv)
Pi(t)
e−β(t)V I
0,i(Tv). (20)
where
β(t)=R0(Tv) − R(t) (21)
denotes the discount factor used to discount from time t during the cycle to the beginning of the next
cycle.6 The ￿rst term in (20) represents the discounted pro￿t stream that accrues to incumbent ￿rms
with certainty during the current cycle, and the second term is the expected discounted value of being an
incumbent at the beginning of the next cycle. In a cyclical equilibrium, the identi￿cation of commercially
viable ideas can be credibly signalled immediately and all search in their sector stops until the next cycle
(see Lemma 2 in the Appendix). Unsuccessful entrepreneurs have no incentive to falsely announce search
success. As a result, an entrepreneur￿s signal is credible, and other entrepreneurs will exert their eﬀorts in
sectors where they have a better chance of becoming the dominant entrepreneur.
In the cyclical equilibrium, entrepreneurs￿ conjectures ensure no more entrepreneurship in a sector once
a signal of success has been received, until after the next implementation. The time t ∈ (T∗
v,T v) expected
value of a viable idea whose implementation is delayed until time Tv is thus:
V D
i (t)=e−β(t)V I
0,i(Tv). (22)
In the cyclical equilibrium, such delay is optimal; i.e. V D
i (t) >VI
i (t) throughout the contraction. Successful
entrepreneurs are happier to forego immediate pro￿ts and delay implementation until the boom in order to
ensure a longer reign of incumbency. Since no implementation occurs during the cycle, by delaying, ￿rms
are assured of incumbency until at least Tv+1. Incumbency beyond that time depends on the probability
that another viable ideas is identi￿ed.
The symmetry of sectors implies that search eﬀort is allocated evenly over all sectors that have not yet
experienced a success within the cycle. In the posited cyclical equilibrium, the probability of not being
displaced at the next implementation is
Pi(Tv)=e x p
Ã
−￿
Z Tv
T ∗
v
hi(τ)dτ
!
. (23)
6Throughout, we use the subscript 0 to denote the value of a variable immediately after the boom. Formally, for any
variable X(•),w ed e ￿ne X(t)=l i m τ→t− X(τ) and X0(t)=l i m τ→t+ X(τ).
84.1 Within—Cycle Dynamics
In equilibrium, factor prices are proportional to their marginal products. Consequently, standard aggre-
gation results hold and aggregate output can be expressed as
Y (t)= ﬂ A
1−α
v−1K(t)αL(t)1−α, (24)
where
ﬂ Av−1 =e x p
µZ 1
0
lnAi(Tv−1)di
¶
. (25)
Note that this endogenous component of TFP is ￿xed through the cycle. In order to aﬀord a station-
ary representation of the economy it is convenient to normalize aggregates by dividing by total factor
productivity using lower￿case letters to denotes these de￿ated aggregates:
k(t)=
K(t)
ﬂ Av−1
, c(t)=
C(t)
ﬂ Av−1
, y(t)=
Y (t)
ﬂ Av−1
, ψ(t)=
Ψ(t)
ﬂ Av−1
(26)
Consequently, the intensive form production function is given by
y(t)=k(t)αL(t)1−α. (27)
The household￿s Euler equation during the cycle can be expressed as
œ c(t)
c(t)
=
r(t) − ρ
σ
, (28)
where r(t)= œ R(t). The economy￿s aggregate resource constraint is
œ k(t)=y(t) − c(t)+ψ(t) − δk(t). (29)
Finally, factor prices can be expressed as
q(t)=αk(t)α−1L(t)1−α (30)
w(t)=e−γ(1 − α) ﬂ Av−1k(t)αL(t)−α. (31)
Note that the wage rate is less than its marginal product by a factor e−γ,r e ￿ecting the fact that a fraction
1 −e−γ goes in the form of pro￿ts to intermediate producers. Moreover, free entry of replacement capital
implies that
r(t)=( 1− τi)(q(t) − δ), (32)
where the capital tax rate is allowed to vary between expansions (i = X) and contractions (i = C).
94.1.1 The Expansion (Tv−1 → T∗
v)
We now trace out the evolution of the economy implied by the behavior posited above. We start immedi-
ately following an implementation boom, when capital, consumption and output take on the initial values
k0(Tv−1),c 0(Tv−1) and y0(Tv−1), respectively. During the expansion all labor is used in production so
that
L(t)=1 . (33)
Combining this condition with (27), (28), (29), (30) and (32) yields transitional dynamics that are identical
to those of the Ramsey model:
œ c(t)
c(t)
=
(1 − τX)αk(t)α−1 − δ − ρ
σ
(34)
œ k(t)
k(t)
= k(t)α − c(t) − δk(t)+ψ(t). (35)
These dynamics are illustrated using a phase diagram in Figure 1.
c=0
.
k=0
.
c
k 0
A
B
c0
c*
k0 k*
Figure 1:D y n a m i c si nP h a s e1
During this expansionary phase, both consumption and capital grow, so we restrict attention to the
lower left quadrant of the phase diagram. As capital accumulates, the wage grows and the interest rate
declines. However, for the dynamic path to be consistent with the cyclical equilibrium, the dynamic path
must also lie between the curves OAand OB in Figure 1. During the ￿rst phase of the cycle, entrepreneurial
10search with delayed implementation cannot be optimal. That is
￿V D(t) <w (t). (36)
As the capital stock accumulates and TFP grows, w(t) rises through time. Moreover, as the subsequent
boom approaches V D(t) grows at the rate of interest. As long as the path of the economy lies between
OA and OB it must be true that
r(t) >
œ w(t)
w(t)
. (37)
Consequently, the ￿rst phase of the cycle comes to an end in ￿nite time.
After the date, T∗
v, if all labor were to remain in production, returns to search eﬀort would strictly
dominate those in production. As a result, labor eﬀort is re￿allocated from production and into search and
this triggers the next phase of the cycle. During the transition from one phase to the next, all aggregate
variables evolve smoothly (see Lemma ??).
4.1.2 The Downturn (T∗
v → Tv)
During this phase, capital continues to be accumulated so that (32) must still hold. However, now there is
search, so that L(t) < 1. Free entry into entrepreneurship implies ￿V D(t)=w(t), so that it must be the
case that
r(t)=
œ V D(t)
V D(t)
=
œ w(t)
w(t)
. (38)
Combining these conditions with (27), (28), (29), (30) and (31) implies that during the slowdown, con-
sumption, capital and the labor force in production evolve according to the following dynamical system:
œ c(t)
c(t)
=
(1 − τC)
£
αk(t)α−1L(t)1−α − δ
¤
− ρ
σ
(39)
œ k(t)=k(t)αL(t)1−α − c(t) − δk(t)+ψ(t) (40)
œ L(t)
L(t)
= −
c(t)+ψ(t)
k(t)
+
µ
1 − α
α
¶
δ + τC
µ
k(t)
α−1 L(t)
1−α −
δ
α
¶
(41)
The value of œ L(t)/L(t) is negative during this phase and is ensured by condition (63). Initially, the
consumption￿capital ratio c(t)/k(t) also continues to decline. However, as L(t) declines, the marginal
product of capital falls and investment starts to fall. Eventually, in the hypothesized cycle, c(t)/k(t) starts
to rise again. Note that the variable G(t), government expenditure in the recession, enters here to lower
capital accumulation, and labor adjustment in the recession. This shall be one of the policies focused on
in the policy analysis.
Note that the implied path for L(t) during this phase implies a path for the fraction of the labor eﬀort
engaged in search, H(t)=1−L(t). This, in turn, determines the measure of sectors in which commercially
viable ideas are identi￿ed at each date:
− œ P(t)=￿[1 − L(t)], (42)
11where P(T∗
v)=1 .7 At the end of the cycle, the fraction of sectors that have experienced successful search
is therefore
1 − P(Tv)=
Z Tv
T∗
v
￿[1 − L(τ)]dτ. (43)
4.1.3 The Implementation Boom
We denote the improvement in total factor productivity during implementation, e(1−α)Γv, where Γv =
ln
£ ﬂ Av/ ﬂ Av−1
¤
. Productivity growth at the boom is given by
Γv = γ (1 − P(Tv)). (44)
A key implication of the assumption that investment is (at least partially) reversible is that household
consumption must evolve smoothly over the period Tv ￿ it cannot jump discontinuously. Intuitively, if
households anticipated a sharp rise in consumption in the future they could raise their utility by converting
some of the capital stock into consumption goods immediately. As a result, the household￿s Euler equation
implies that the rate of return on any asset held over the boom must equal zero.8 In particular, the return
to storing intermediate goods until after the boom must be zero. A positive return would exist if the wage
rose discontinuously upon implementation because it would be cheaper to produce extra intermediates at
the low wage just before the boom and substitute them for production at the high wage afterwards. The
fact that, in equilibrium, the wage must therefore evolve smoothly across the boom pins down a tight
relationship between the growth in productivity and the labor eﬀort allocated back into production:
(1 − α)Γv = −αlnL(Tv) (45)
During the boom, ￿rm values and wages grow in proportion to labor productivity. Since, just before
the boom ￿V I(Tv)=w(Tv), an immediate corollary is that
￿V I
0 (Tv)=w0(Tv)=( 1− α)e−γ ﬂ Avk0(Tv)α. (46)
Output growth through the boom is given by
∆lnY (Tv)=( 1− α)Γv − (1 − α)lnL(Tv)=
µ
1 − α
α
¶
Γv (47)
It follows directly from that growth in output exceeds the discount factor across the boom. Since pro￿ts are
proportional to output, this explains why ￿rms are willing to delay implementation during the downturn.
Because investment is reversible, consumption cannot jump at the boom, and so all of the increase in
output is associated with a sharp rise in investment.
7T h er a t eo fc h a n g ei nP is given by
˙ P
P = −￿hi. But since labor is allocated symmetrically to innovation only in the
measure P of sectors where no innovation has occurred, hi = H
P ,s ot h a t ˙ P = −￿H.
8This is in stark contrast to Shleifer (1986) and Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), where consumption jumps at the boom.
124.2 The Stationary Cyclical Equilibrium
We focus on a stationary cyclical equilibrium growth path in which the boom size is constant at Γ every
cycle and the cycle length is given by ∆ = Tv − Tv−1. In addition, we denote the length of the stationary
expansion phase as ∆∗ = T∗
v − Tv−1. Through this cycle, optimal entrepreneurial behaviour must satisfy
following requirements:
￿ At time t = Tv, ￿rms must prefer to implement immediately, rather than delay implementation until
later in the cycle or the beginning of the next cycle:
V I
0 (Tv) >VD
0 (Tv). (E1)
￿ In sectors where viable ideas are identi￿ed during the downturn, ￿r m sm u s tp r e f e rt ow a i tu n t i lt h e
beginning of the next cycle rather than implement earlier and sell at the limit price:
V I(t) <VD(t) ∀ t ∈ (T ∗
v,T v) (E2)
￿ Search is not optimal during the expansion of the cycle. Since in this phase of the cycle ￿V D(t) <w (t),
this condition requires that
￿V I(t) <w (t) ∀ t ∈ (Tv−1,T∗
v) (E3)
￿ Finally, in constructing the equilibrium above, we have implicitly imposed the requirement that the
downturn is not so long that viable ideas are identi￿ed in every sector:
P(Tv) > 0. (E4)
In Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2006a) we show that under fairly weak parametric restrictions, only one
pair of values
³
￿ Γ, ￿ ∆
´
can satisfy conditions (E1) to (E4) along a stationary cyclical path.9
4.3 Simulated Aggregate Behavior
As the economy￿s evolution is dictated by dynamic paths for capital, consumption, investment and entre-
preneurial eﬀort, that are the solutions to diﬀerential equations, it is not possible to solve for the behavior
of this economy analytically. We therefore simulate the economy for a benchmark set of parameter values
and sketch the evolution of aggregates through the cycle.10 The exercise also suﬃces to establish existence
of the cycle. We take as a benchmark the following sets of parameter values:
9This does not imply that the equilibrium is globally unique, only that it is so within the class of stationary cyclical paths
described above. We know that there exists at least one other equilibrium growth path ￿ the standard acyclical one.
10The simulations are performed in Gauss, and are available from the authors upon request.
13T a b l e1 :B a s e l i n eC a l i b r a t i o n
Parameter α γ ρ σ ￿ δ ω
Value 0.30 0.20 0.025 1.00 1.80 0.10 0.70
The parameters α and γ imply a capital share of 0.3, a labor share of about 0.6, and a pro￿ts h a r e
of 0.1. The unit￿valued intertemporal elasticity of substitution implies logarithmic preferences (following
Lucas, 1987). Given these values and a depreciation rate of 10%, we chose ￿, ρ and ω so as to match a
long￿run annual growth rate of almost 2%, an average risk￿free real interest rate of roughly 4%, and a
cycle length of approximately 8 years. These values roughly correspond to average data for the post￿war
US. The implied value of ω is admittedly rather high if we interpret it purely as a tax on pro￿ts. However,
as noted earlier, we view ω as representing a number factors that may aﬀect the ratio of pro￿ts to wages
(e.g. labor market frictions, implementation costs, imitation). For the benchmark parameters a cycle with
average growth of 1.9% per annum is obtained.
Figure 2 plots the paths of the main aggregates: consumption, investment and income, over the cycle.
Aggregate GDP expands for just over 5 years before declining for the remainder of the cycle, and then
booming dramatically just before the end of the eighth year. Despite the considerable volatility of output,
and, to a lesser extent GDP, capital markets allow consumers to maintain a relatively smooth consumption
path with the bulk of ￿uctuations occurring in investment. Note that consumption growth does vary over
the cycle, even becoming negative during the last year but, as in the data, its variation is small compared to
investment. The diﬀerence between GDP and aggregate income only arises in the economy￿s recessionary
phase and happens because GDP includes the value of entrepreneurial eﬀort allocated to the search for
improvements as well as measured output or aggregate income.
5T h e W e l f a r e B e n e ﬁto fC y c l e s
In the spirit of Lucas (1993) and Barlevy (2004b), we limit our analysis to the study of steady state growth
paths, without considering transition paths between steady states. Consequently, the policy experiments
performed here are not computations of the overall welfare consequences of policy variations or changes in
expectations starting from a particular steady state. Such analysis would involve computing transitional
dynamics and would undermine comparability with earlier papers. Instead, what we report here are the
welfare implications of removing households from an economy evolving along one stationary growth path
and dropping them into one evolving along another, holding constant their initial asset position.
When comparing steady￿state welfare along the steady￿state growth path of any endogenous growth
model with two asset stocks, a complication arises because the steady state growth path is always associated
with a particular ratio of these state variables. If a policy variation changes this steady￿state ratio, initial
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Figure 2: Aggregate Variables
conditions must change. Along the acyclical long￿run growth path of the current model, for example, the
ratio k = K/ ﬂ A takes on a constant, particular value for each set of parameters. This makes it impossible to
derive a meaningful comparison of steady￿state welfare under alternative policy scenarios because initial
values of both K and ﬂ A cannot held constant.
In the cyclical steady state here, however, such a comparison is feasible because k varies over the cycle.
In what follows, we normalize the initial value of ﬂ A =1and choose the date t0 ∈ (0,∆) at which to
start computing welfare, so that k(t0)=￿ k across all parameter settings. This ensures that steady￿state
welfare for each policy scenario and for each equilibrium is computed from identical starting values of the
state variables. The welfare gains/losses that we measure therefore re￿ect only the impact of changes in
long￿run growth and the shape of cycles, and not changes in the initial values of capital and TFP.
5.0.1 Welfare Calculations
The representative agent￿s welfare, assuming log utility, in the cycling economy at time t0 is given by:
W (t0)=
Γe−ρ∆
ρ(1 − e−ρ∆)
+
R t0+∆
t0 e−ρ(t−t0) lnC(t)dt
1 − e−ρ∆ (48)
15It is also shown there that, in the acyclical economy, welfare is given by:
Wa(t0)=
1
ρ
lnC(t0)+
ga
ρ2 (49)
with
C(t0)=
µ
ρ + ga
α(1 − τ)
+
µ
1 − α
α
¶
δ − ga
¶
K(t0). (50)
As the simulations above indicate, since consumers are able to smooth consumption through the capital
market, ￿uctuations in output are unlikely to have major impacts on welfare directly. However, as we shall
see below, government policies that aim to alter such ￿uctuations can have large eﬀects on welfare indirectly
through their impact on the economy￿s average growth rate.11
5.1 Cyclical and Acyclical Comparison
Before turning to a comparison of outcomes under diﬀerent policies, we compare welfare and growth in
the cycling and acyclical equilibria. Strictly speaking this is not a policy choice, unless it is possible for
governments to coordinate agents￿ expectations on the equilibrium, but it is of interest to consider it here
as it allows direct comparison with the literature that grew out of Lucas￿ original comparison.
Table 2 compares the cycling and acyclical steady states for the benchmark parameter values. Com-
puting welfare in the cycling economy at the benchmark k =1 .977 implies measuring from a point 0.693
years (8 months) into the expansion.12 We normalize welfare in this benchmark case at 1 and measure
welfare in all other scenarios relative to this value. For this baseline calibration, steady state welfare is
over 30% higher in the cyclical equilibrium than the acyclical one. The reason for this is that the cycling
economy is able to sustain a considerably higher average growth rate. The higher variance in the growth
rate of output has little direct impact on welfare because consumption evolves relatively smoothly (as in
the data).
Table 2: Cyclical vs. Acyclical
Cyclical Acyclical
A v e r a g eG r o w t hR a t e( % ) 1.90 1.50
Variance of Growth Rate (%) 0.05 0.00
Relative Welfare (log utility) 1.00 0.68
To understand why growth is higher in the cyclical equilibrium, suppose (hypothetically) that future
growth along the two paths were expected to be the same. Along the acyclical growth path, productiv-
ity improvements are implemented immediately, so that the opportunity cost (due to lost production) of
11We have conducted the welfare analyses with σ > 1 (and which satisfy existence conditions). This makes little diﬀerence
to the main results.
12We choose this benchmark because it corresponds to the capital stock at the boom in one of the higher capital simulations
to follow. Choosing a diﬀerent benchmark does not eﬀect the qualitative nature of the comparison.
16searching for new ideas rises in proportion to the growth in their value, with no reallocation of labor eﬀort
across sectors. During the downturn of a cyclical equilibrium implementation is delayed, so that the op-
portunity cost would not rise in proportion to their value unless search intensity increases. Consequently,
in equilibrium, innovative eﬀort is high and rising during downturns. During expansions, following imple-
mentation, the opportunity cost of search rises so much relative to the bene￿ts that to equate them would
require more labor eﬀort to be allocated into production than is available. Since search eﬀort is bounded
below by zero, it follows that the average level of entrepreneurship would be higher in the cyclical economy
for the same expected future growth. Since higher expected future growth increases the incentives for
innovation in both equilibria, the actual long￿run growth rate must be higher in the cyclical one.
Since the reasoning underlying the higher growth rate in the cycling economy is generically true for
any cycling equilibrium, the result is robust to parameter variations. It stands in stark contrast to the
majority of the literature which has, for the most part, argued that the welfare implications of ￿uctuations
are small and negative. Here they are large and positive.
6 Impact of Stabilization Policies
6.1 Tax on Proﬁts
In this policy experiment, we set the capital tax rate equal to zero and consider variations in the tax rate
on pro￿ts. We assume that tax revenue is immediately transferred back to households in a lump-sum
fashion, so that ψ(t)=0and
Υ(t)=ωπ(t) ∀ t. (51)
The table below documents the implications of varying the tax on pro￿ts, ω. The benchmark where ω =0 .7
is highlighted in bold.
Table 3: Variation in the ProﬁtT a x
ω value Welfare ﬂ g(%) Var(g) Expansion Contraction Acyclic Welfare Acyclic g
0.50 1.94 3.3 0.120 2.98 2.91 1.61 2.8
0.55 1.80 3.0 0.100 3.20 2.89 1.38 2.5
0.60 1.57 2.6 0.091 3.70 2.87 1.14 2.2
0.65 1.20 2.2 0.069 4.23 2.84 0.91 1.9
0.70 1.00 1.9 0.056 5.03 2.82 0.68 1.5
0.75 0.83 1.6 0.041 5.92 2.81 0.44 1.2
0.80 0.56 1.3 0.030 8.45 2.78 0.21 0.9
At a super￿cial level, such taxes appear to have favorable stabilization properties. The variance of the
growth rate falls with ω and the economy spends longer in expansionary phases, and less time in recessions.
Comparing the two extreme values reported in the table. The economy with ω =0 .5 spends nearly half its
17time in recession, whereas that with ω =0 .8 is in expansion over 75% of the time. The high tax economy
has much less variability in its growth rate ￿ the variance of growth in the ω =0 .5 economy is four times
that in the ω =0 .8 economy, and its contractions are shorter and less severe (output falls by less). In
short, raising pro￿t taxes would seem an ideal countercyclical policy.
But the value of ω also aﬀects average long￿run growth, ﬂ g.A sp r o ￿ts are the inducement to innovation,
the post-tax value of entrepreneurship is lower with higher ω and entrepreneurial levels are correspondingly
lower, so that growth rates are too. The intuition for this is similar to that which occurs when pro￿t
taxes are levied in the acyclical economy, as con￿rmed by the ￿nal column; by lowering net returns to
entrepreneurship, both it and the growth rate fall.
T h er e a s o nf o rt h es m o o t h i n ge ﬀects of such taxes is less obvious. As returns to entrepreneurship are
lower, it takes longer for the value of returns to entrepreneurial eﬀort to approach those to eﬀort allocated
into production in the cycling economy. Consequently, the economy spends longer in the expansionary
phase. But since the expansionary phase is not one in which eﬀorts are allocated to future productivity
improvements, growth rates fall. A lower growth rate is also consistent with a smaller contractionary
phase. The relationship between the size of the jump in output at the boom, Γ, and the allocation of
eﬀorts to entrepreneurship is tightly pinned down by the no arbitrage condition over the boom. As is
therefore clear from the welfare results in the ￿rst column, the smoothing eﬀects of such taxes come at
considerable cost to consumer welfare.
6.2 Tax/Subsidy on Capital
We now ￿x ω =0 .7 and consider variations in the tax rate on capital. As before we assume that tax
revenue is immediately transferred back to households in a lump-sum fashion, so that ψ(t)=0and
Υ(t)=τi [q(t) − δ]K(t)+ωπ(t) ∀ t (52)
Table 4 documents the results for a range of values of the capital income tax that is levied in the
expansionary phase τX (t) and the contractionary phase τC (t). We allow for both positive (taxes) and
negative (subsidies) values of the variable, and we again list the baseline values in bold. As in the acyclical
equilibrium, average long￿run growth is unaﬀected by these alternatives. The tax combinations do aﬀect
phase lengths, particularly expansions. However, these are of little consequence for the representative
household ￿ although steady￿state welfare does vary because of diﬀerences in the path of consumption
over the cycle, the eﬀects are tiny because long￿run growth of consumption is the dominant factor.
Taxing capital returns in the expansion, τX > 0, lengthens the expansion. On the one hand, the
increase in the cost of accumulating capital lowers the average capital stock that is held over the cycle,
but since net accumulation occurs through the expansionary phase, as the rate of accumulation is reduced,
more time is required for the capital stock to accumulate to the point where it matches the increased
18productivity arising from the boom. Subsidizing capital accumulation in the contraction, τC < 0, has a
qualitatively similar, though less pronounced, eﬀect. The expansion increases by a year when τX = .1,
but by less than six months for τC = −0.1. The subsidizing of capital accumulation in the contraction has
this eﬀect even though it has the opposite consequence of increasing the average level of capital holdings
through the cycle. The subsidy to accumulation in recession makes consumers willing to hold a larger stock
of capital on average, but since net accumulation of capital occurs through the expansion ￿ when the cost
of capital is relatively low due to the implementation boom ￿ the expansionary phase must last longer.
Thus, although these taxes have substantial eﬀects on volatility as they shift the pattern of accumulation
through the cycle, the welfare impacts are small.
Table 4: Variation in the Capital Tax
τX τC Var(g) Expansion Contraction
0.15 0.00 0.065 6.59 2.95
0.10 0.00 0.061 6.04 2.90
0.05 0.00 0.054 5.49 2.86
0.00 0.00 0.056 5.03 2.82
-0.05 0.00 0.049 4.81 2.79
-0.10 0.00 0.048 4.38 2.76
0.00 -0.10 0.053 5.44 2.81
0.00 -0.05 0.058 5.06 2.82
0.00 0.00 0.056 5.03 2.82
0.00 0.05 0.051 4.87 2.82
0.00 0.10 0.052 4.62 2.83
0.00 0.15 0.048 4.61 2.83
6.3 Intertemporal Reallocation
The policy variations discussed above both assume that the government balances its budget every period.
Here we consider a tax￿transfer scheme that reallocates resources between the two phases of the cycle.
Speci￿cally we assume
Ψ(t)=Υi − ωπ(t) 6=0 (53)
where i ∈ {X,C} and
Z T∗
v
Tv−1
e−[R(t)−R(Tv−1)]ψ
Xdt +
Z Tv
T ∗
v
e−[R(t)−R(Tv−1)]ψ
Cdt =0 . (54)
Table 5 documents various the implications of various combinations of net transfers for the steady state
cyclical path. In each case we ￿xav a l u ef o rψ
X a n dt h e ns e tψ
C so that (54) holds in equilibrium. We
consider both countercyclical and pro￿cyclical reallocations. In the benchmark calibration, GDP averages
about 1.25￿ ﬂ Av over the cycle (see Figure 2), so the numbers in the ￿rst two columns can be interpreted
as representing something close to fractions of GDP (the federal primary surplus averages around 2%).
19These intertemporal re￿allocations have no impact on long￿run growth (growth remains at its bench-
mark value of 1.9%). On the other hand, as can be seen, countercyclical tax/transfer policies can be used
to substantially reduce the variance of output growth. Transferring resources from the expansion to the
recession reduces the marginal utility cost of allocating labour to search. Search activity starts earlier,
causing the expansion to become shorter. The resulting increase in search activity at each date after
T∗ also causes both the recession length to contract and the boom size to decline. All of these eﬀects
contribute to lower volatility. Once again, however, the welfare impacts of the countercyclical reallocation
are negligible, mainly because households are able to undo such lump￿sum reallocations via their savings
behaviour and because there are no long￿run growth bene￿ts.
Table 5: Intertemporal Reallocation via Lump—Sum Transfers
ψ
X ψ
C Var(g) Expansion Contraction Γ
0.02 -0.054 0.070 6.77 3.03 0.189
0.01 -0.023 0.066 5.63 2.91 0.168
0.00 0.00 0.056 5.03 2.82 0.152
-0.01 0.0200 0.049 4.60 2.76 0.138
-0.02 0.0360 0.044 4.12 2.69 0.126
-0.03 0.0485 0.041 3.70 2.65 0.121
-0.04 0.0590 0.040 3.43 2.61 0.115
-0.05 0.0685 0.034 3.12 2.58 0.108
7 Conclusions
We consider an economy in which cycles are the equilibrium outcome of a Schumpeterian endogenous
growth process. Allowing the cycle to be endogenously determined forces us to explicitly recognize that it
may not be possible to target one aspect of the economy￿s evolution, say the volatility of output, or the
length of contractions, without aﬀecting other components, such as the growth rate. To our knowledge,
t h ea n a l y s i sw eh a v ep e r f o r m e dh e r ei st h e￿rst one which examines the general equilibrium eﬀects of
counter-cyclical policies on both growth rates and cyclical features.13 We used our framework to analyze
the welfare impact of (1) eradicating cycles by switching to another equilibrium growth path, and (2)
policies designed to mitigate ￿uctuations along the cyclical growth path.
Because contractions enable entrepreneurs to allocate labour eﬀort towards productivity￿improving
activities, they serve an important role here. This is re￿ected in the paper￿s two main ￿ndings. Firstly, the
cyclical economy devotes more resources to growth promoting activities on average than does the acyclical
one. Consequently, average growth rates are higher in the cyclical economy. Secondly, policies designed
to mitigate contractions and reduce the volatility of output, will often come at the cost of reducing the
13Francois and Shi (1999) note the potential for implementation cycles to increase growth, but their model does not permit
aw e l f a r ea n a l y s i s .
20economy￿s average growth rate. The overall conclusions here are thus quite diﬀerent to those usually
reported in the welfare costs of business cycles literature.
One reason for the stark contrast between our results and those reported by Barlevy (2004a) is that,
in the Schumpeterian world described here, capital does not play a ￿rst￿order important role in the
growth process. According to Schumpeter (1950), entrepreneurs are the key movers of productivity, and
this is an idea￿intensive (not capital￿intensive) process. Fixed capital formation is required to oﬀset
depreciation, and to augment capital stocks in response to productivity growth, but it plays a largely
auxiliary role. Smoothing the investment rate yields no bene￿ts for long￿term growth. In contrast,
smoothing the allocation of entrepreneurial eﬀorts can damage the growth generation process.
In the analysis conducted here, we have abstracted from several potentially important issues in order
to emphasize the potential role of endogenous cyclical variation. For example, variations in involuntary
unemployment during recessions might have additional welfare costs that are not being considered here.
Moreover, the cycle that we study here is deterministic and stationary. Variations in the aggregate growth
rate and the length and amplitude of the cycle could be introduced by adding a exogenous ￿uctuations
in productivity growth. Introducing features such as these would quantitatively aﬀect our results, but we
believe the qualitative implications would continue to hold.
Appendix
Proposition 1: If ￿γ(1 − e−γ)(1 − ω)+ρ(γ(1 − e−γ)+1 /(σ − 1)) > 0, then there exists an acyclical
equilibrium with a constant growth rate given by
ga =m a x
·
γ [￿(1 − e−γ)(1 − ω) − ρe−γ]
(σ − 1)γ +1
,0
¸
. (55)
Proof: Since xi and pi are proportional to Ai it is easy to verify that solutions are symmetric across
sectors: Ki = K, and Li = L for all i,w i t hw given by:
w(t)=( 1− α)e−γy(t)/(1 − H(t)). (56)
Since implementation is immediate, the aggregate rate of endogenous productivity growth is
g(t)=￿γH(t) (57)
No￿arbitrage implies that
r(t)+￿H(t)=
(1 − ω)π(t)
V I(t)
+
œ V I(t)
V I(t)
(58)
21Since, innovation occurs in every period, free entry into entrepreneurship implies that
￿V I(t)=w(t). (59)
Along the balanced growth path, all aggregates grow at the rate g. From the Euler equation it follows that
r(t)=ρ + σg. (60)
Along the BGP, H(t)=H is constant. Diﬀerentiating (56) and (59) w.r.t. to time yields
œ V I(t)
V I(t)
= g + φ (61)
using this to substitute for
œ V I(t)
V I(t) in (58), and using (60) to substitute for r(t) and (14) to substitute for
π(t), and solving for g yields (55). For the consumer￿s utility to be bounded we need r = ρ + σg>gso
that:
ρ +( σ − 1)
·
γ [￿(1 − e−γ)(1 − ω) − ρe−γ]
(σ − 1)γ +1
¸
> 0. (62)
Re￿arranging yields the condition in the proposition.¥
Lemma 1: In a cyclical equilibrium, the identiﬁcation of commercially viable ideas can be credibly signalled
immediately and all search in their sector stops until the next round of implementation.
Proof: We show: (1) that if a signal of success from a potential entrepreneur is credible, other entrepre-
neurs stop innovation in that sector; (2) given (1), entrepreneurs have no incentive to falsely claim success.
Part (1): If entrepreneur i0s signal of success is credible then all other entrepreneurs believe that i has a
productivity advantage which is eγ times better than the existing incumbent. If continuing to innovate
in that sector, another entrepreneur will, with positive probability, also develop a productive advantage
of eγ. Such an innovation yields expected pro￿t of 0, since, in developing their improvement, they do not
observe the non-implemented improvements of others, so that both ￿rms Bertrand compete with the same
technology. Returns to attempting innovation in another sector where there has been no signal of success,
or from simply working in production, w(t) > 0, are thus strictly higher.
Part (2): If success signals are credible, entrepreneurs know that upon success, further innovation in their
sector will cease, from Part (1), by their sending of a costless signal. They are thus indiﬀerent between
falsely signalling success when it has not arrived, and sending no signal. Thus, there exists a signalling
equilibrium in which only successful entrepreneurs send a signal of success.¥
Proposition 2: If, during an expansion, the dynamic paths of consumption and capital satisfy
³
1 −
α
σ
´
k(t)α +
µ
ρ +( 1− σ)δ
σ
¶
k(t) >c (t) >
µ
1 − α
α
¶
δk(t), (63)
then there exists a T∗
v such that for the ﬁrst time in a given cycle ￿V D(T∗
v)=w(T ∗
v).
22Proof: Subtracting (35) from (34) we get
œ c(t)
c(t)
−
œ k(t)
k(t)
=
c(t)
k(t)
−
³
1 −
α
σ
´
k(t)α−1 −
ρ +( 1− σ)δ
σ
(64)
It follows that in order for c(t)/k(t) to be declining in the ￿rst phase
c(t)
k(t)
<
³
1 −
α
σ
´
k(t)α−1 +
ρ +( 1− σ)δ
σ
. (65)
which is the left hand inequality in (63). For r> œ w/w,w er e q u i r et h a t
αk(t)α−1 − δ > α
œ k(t)
k(t)
(66)
Substitution using (35 )yields
αk(t)α−1 > δ + α
µ
k(t)α−1 −
c(t)
k(t)
− δ
¶
, (67)
which rearranges to the right hand inequality in (63).¥
Lemma 2: At time T∗
v, when entrepreneurial search ﬁrst commences in a cycle, L(T ∗
v)=1and output,
investment and consumption must evolve continuously.
Proof: Since capital depreciation rates are independent of utilization, and its marginal product is always
positive, installed capital is always fully utilized. At T∗
v, since the discount factor does not jump, neither
does V D. With non￿variable capital utilization, the wage must jump up if L(t) jumps down. Since just
before T∗
v, ￿V D(t) <w (t), this is not possible. It follows that L(T∗
v)=1and falls smoothly from that
point on.
Since L adjusts smoothly, and capital utilization is non￿variable, output cannot jump down at T∗
v.S i n c e
the discount factor does not jump, consumption cannot jump at T∗
v either. Consequently, investment, œ K,
cannot jump at T∗
v. Note further that r(t)=q(t)−δ cannot jump down instantaneously with non-variable
capital utilization. It follows that wage growth
œ w(t)
w(t) must jump up at T∗
v and employment growth in
production
œ L(t)
L(t) must jump to a negative level.¥
Proposition 3: Asset market clearing under reversible investment at the boom requires that
(1 − α)Γv = −αlnL(Tv).
Proof: During the boom, for entrepreneurs to prefer to implement immediately, it must be the case that
V I
0 (Tv) >VD
0 (Tv). Just prior to the boom, when the probability of displacement is negligible, the value
of implementing immediately must equal that of delaying until the boom: δV I(Tv)=δV D(Tv)=w(Tv).
Free entry into entrepreneurship at the boom requires that δV I
0 (Tv) ≤ w0 (Tv). The opportunity cost of
￿nancing entrepreneurship is the rate of return on shares in incumbent ￿rms in sectors where no innovation
23has occurred. Since this return across the boom must equal zero, it must be the case that V I
0 (Tv)=V I(Tv).
It follows that asset market clearing at the boom requires
log
µ
w0 (Tv)
w(Tv)
¶
=( 1− α)Γv − lnL(Tv) ≥ 0. (68)
In sectors with no entrepreneurial success, incumbent ￿rms could sell claims to stored output, use them
to ￿nance greater current production and then store the good to sell at the beginning of the next boom.
Free entry into storage implies that the rate of return (the growth in the wage) to this activity must satisfy
log
µ
w0 (Tv)
w(Tv)
¶
=( 1− α)Γv − lnL(Tv) ≤ 0. (69)
Combining (68) and (69) yields (45).¥
Welfare Calculations (log utility): Welfare in the cyclical economy can be expressed as
W =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt lnc(t)dt =
∞ X
v=0
e−ρ∆v
Z ∆
0
e−ρt [Γv +l nc(t)]dt
= Γ
µ
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ
¶ ∞ X
v=0
e−ρ∆vv +
ÃZ ∆
0
e−ρt lnc(t)dt
!
∞ X
v=0
e−ρ∆v
= Γ
µ
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ
¶
e−ρ∆
(1 − e−ρ∆)
2 +
R ∆
0 e−ρt lnc(t)dt
1 − e−ρ∆
=
Γe−ρ∆
ρ(1 − e−ρ∆)
+
R ∆
0 e−ρt lnc(t)dt
1 − e−ρ∆
Welfare in the acyclically growing economy is given by
Wa(0) =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt lnC(t)dt =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [lnC(0) + gat]dt
=
1
ρ
lnC(0) +
Z ∞
0
e−ρtgatdt =
1
ρ
lnC(0) −
1
ρ
Z ∞
0
gatde−ρt
=
1
ρ
lnC(0) −
1
ρ
£
gate−ρt¤∞
0 +
ga
ρ
Z ∞
0
e−ρtdt
=
1
ρ
lnC(0) +
ga
ρ2
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